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Between Rocks and Hard 
Places? The Strategic Path of Jorda n in a 
Changing Middle East 
John C. Creed 
College of Charleston 
Jordan :S decision to closely associate itself with the US-led "war 
on terror" can best be explained by examining aspects of the 
country s political economy. The policy direction charted by King 
Abdullah raises new dilemmas for the country in the wake of on-
going Israeli-Palestinian tensions and Americas campaign 
against Iraq. 
The events of September 11 have sharpened security con-cerns for many nations in the Arab world . Almost imme-diately after the attacks, observations by American 
policymakers and commentators that the men suspected of hi-
jacking four American aircraft were all from the Middle East, 
most notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt, reinforced politically sen-
sitive issues for these regimes and others about the levels and 
consequences of domestic discontent brewing within their socie-
ties. While relatively small segments of Arab national popula-
tions support the specific methods and ideology of al-Qaeda and 
Osama Bin Laden, the overall critique of prevailing regional 
politics they espouse, including the prevalence of official corrup-
tion and its connections to persistent and widespread economic 
and social degradation in the Arab world, retains a potential to 
mobilize many. Moreover, the ongoing crises in Israeli-
Palestinian relations, coupled with American threats to expand 
its "war on terror" to Iraq and other Arab states heightened 
anxieties about future regional stability and posed fundamental 
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questions for the Arab world about ongoing relationships with 
the US. 
No Middle Eastern actor feels greater pressures in these are-
nas today than Jordan. Geographically pinched between the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict and America's ongoing campaign 
against Iraq, Jordan is continually concerned for its physical and 
military security in an uncertain regional environment. But do-
mestically too, Jordan has long worried about its economic and 
political future, particularly given its tenuous demographic bal-
ance between East Bank Transjordanians and majority Palestin-
ian population. Even before the events of the past year, promises 
by King Abdullah for greater economic prosperity and further 
democratic reforms have sharply contrasted with the stagnant 
levels of development and tighter domestic political restrictions 
prevailing in the country. Jordan's immediate endorsement of the 
US after the events of September 11 and its public efforts to in-
fluence US policy on regional conflicts while continuing to pur-
sue economic help from the West contrasted notably with the 
more ambiguous reactions of other Arab states and exacerbated 
public concerns over the directions of Jordan 's future interna-
tional relations. 1 
In some important ways, Jordan's decision to align so 
strongly with the US in its "war on terror" underscores the coun-
try's current vulnerabilities and stands in marked contrast to 
choices it made during the Gulf War of 1990-91. A decade ago, 
the Jordanian monarchy followed popular sentiment and shunned 
the US position that eventually led to war with Iraq, calculating 
that what it lost economically in regional and international aid 
could be recouped politically through enhanced domestic popu-
1 Stephen Glain, "Amman Dispatch : Slide Rule," The New Republic 19 November 2001 , 
p. 20; Douglas Jehl, "Arab Allies Not Jumping to Join US Side," The New York Times 27 
September 2001 , p. 3. 
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larity (Anderson 1997). Over the past ten years, however, Jordan 
has increasingly sought to portray itself as a forward-looking 
Arab state, willing to embrace elements of a globalizing world 
and make peace with Israel while it carefully pursues economic 
and political reform at home. Given the direction it has em-
barked upon and its current reliance on the international commu-
nity for support in managing its economic difficulties, Jordan is 
today banking on enhanced attention and assistance in exchange 
for its strong political stance against terror. This policy comes 
with significant risks to the regime. As in developing countries 
throughout the world, a segment of Jordan's population believes 
the US and the processes of globalization it promotes serves to 
threaten national, cultural, and religious identities in the region 
or constitutes a form of neo-imperialism. When these perceptions 
are combined with more widely prevailing public concerns over 
persistent domestic hardships and sharp reminders of suffering 
among neighboring Palestinians or Iraqis at the hand of Ameri-
can supported policies, pressures on the Jordanian state inevita-
bly grow. 
The security dilemmas now facing Jordan involve increas-
ingly stark choices between domestic and foreign policy direc-
tions. On the one hand, for Jordan to adopt a foreign policy 
favoring the West that ultimately entails confronting terror on 
terms set by the West runs the risk of alienating significant por-
tions of the domestic population, especially if any "war on ter-
ror" distorts or damages Jordan's brittle economy. The prospects 
of growing gaps between public and governmental outlooks and 
a rise in organized domestic efforts to express popular dissatis-
faction with official policy courts the possibility of more repres-
sive governmental responses, which in turn further 
jeopardizes the Jordanian regime's efforts to credibly promote 
political liberalization at home. A worst-case scenario could 
see an undercutting of Jordan's domestic political stability. On 
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the other hand, for Jordan's foreign policy to express popular 
sentiments and thereby challenge core elements of western 
stands on policy toward Iraq or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
will almost certainly jeopardize American and western sup-
port that the regime has sought to cultivate over the past dec-
ade, thereby endangering the state's capacity to meet 
economic challenges and domestic needs. Traditional explana-
tions for how states resolve such dilemmas that emphasize 
decision-making based on the nature of external threats go 
only so far in accounting for Jordan's recent foreign policy 
behavior and competing perspectives that focus on domestic 
factors primarily serve to underscore the dilemmas that pre-
vail. Instead, increasingly, Jordan's foreign policy alignments 
can be understood by examining aspects of the country's po-
litical economy. The nation's prevailing economic needs and 
the ways these influence the decisions of Jordanian leaders 
pose distinct challenges for the Kingdom. In several important 
ways too, the dilemmas Jordan confronts are emblematic of 
the hurdles facing many regimes in the Arab world. How suc-
cessfully Jordan manages its affairs may provide telling indi-
cators about its future, the future of the region and the 
capacity of the US and the West to pursue its interests in the 
area. After a brief summary of the actions Jordan has taken in 
response to September 11 and the immediate concerns they 
pose, the recent twists and turns of Jordan's strategic path will 
be evaluated from external, domestic and political economy 
perspectives. 
JORDAN'S RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11 
At the time of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, 
D.C ., and Pennsylvania, King Abdullah was in London preparing 
for a weeklong trip to the US intended to culminate in talks with 
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President Bush. Although the King cancelled the visit, his gov-
ernment soon signaled its firm support for the US actions against 
al-Qaeda, arguing that the attacks were carried out by "extrem-
ists who do not represent at all the Arabs and Muslims and serve 
in no way their just causes." 2 As part of this initial response too, 
King Abdullah became the first Arab leader to visit the White 
House three weeks later and indicated that Jordan would con-
tinue sharing intelligence on terrorists with the US.3 These reac-
tions were accompanied by stories originating in Europe and 
reprinted in Jordan that the King and his family had themselves 
been targeted by al-Qaeda for assassination in the summer 2000, 
thereby seeming to establish some tangible connection between 
Jordan and America's plight.4 
Nonetheless, when the US initiated military action against the 
Taliban some weeks later, Jordanian society reacted in near com-
plete opposition. While Islamic critics of the Jordanian govern-
ment condemned American attacks on Afghanistan as a "dirty 
war of extermination" and opposition political parties were pro-
hibited by the government from organizing marches to protest 
US aggression, many Jordanian philanthropic groups set up 
committees in solidarity with Afghanistan. 5 However, official 
Jordanian responses to American actions were notably more 
muted, emphasizing only that the US should take care to spare 
Afghan civilians while warning constituencies within Jordan that 
the regime would take "all necessary measures to maintain na-
2 
"Jordan Backs International Terrorist Efforts, Warns on Security," The Jordan Times 9 
October 200 I . 
3 Sana Kamal, "Taking No Chances ," Middle East International 12 October 2001, p. 11. 
4 See "Bin Laden Wanted to Kill Jordan's Royal Family," The Jordan Times 8 October 
2001. 
5 
"Jordan Backs International Anti-Terrorist Efforts, Warns on Security," The Jordan 
Times 9 October 200 I; CGonomist Intelligence Unit (EnJ), Country Report Jordan, De-
cember 2001, p . 13. 
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tional security for the interests of the country." 6 Soon after, Jor-
danian security forces detained a number of Islamists and Jor-
dan's Penal Code was revised without parliamentary approval to 
broadly redefine terrorism and mandate that violations would 
result in death or life imprisonment. 7 These changes were ac-
companied by multiple security trials in the country that took on 
new domestic and international significance, particularly the case 
of Raed Hijazi, who had been on the FBI's most wanted list and 
stood accused of planning to bomb the Radisson SAS hotel in 
Amman as part of a series of al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on 
American and Israeli targets during millennium celebrations in 
Jordan. 8 At the conclusion of a brief but controversial set of pro-
ceedings, a Jordanian judge found Hijazi guilty of planning the 
attack and sentenced him to death, while at the same time acquit-
ting him of having belonged to al-Qaeda. 9 Ramifications of this 
trial persisted beyond Hijazi 's sentencing as a February 2002 
bomb blast in Amman was thought to have targeted one of Jor-
dan's top investigators in the case.' 0 By the end of 2001, King 
Abdullah had approved another controversial temporary law 
permitting Jordanian troop deployments to Afghanistan for a 
"humanitarian mission" involving medical and mine clearing 
operations in Mazar-e Sharif. 11 Moreover, added restrictions im-
posed on Jordan's media and press increased the risks of criticiz-
6 
"Jordan Backs International Terrorist Efforts, Warns on Security," The Jordan Times 9 
October 200 I . 
7 Sana Kamal, "Taking No Chances. "Middle East International 12 October 200 I, p . 11. 
8 Judith Miller, "Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman," The New York Times 
15 January 2001, pp. Al, A7. 
9 See Sana Kamal, "Terror Trials . ·· Middle East International 11 January 2002, pp . 12-
13. 
10 Howard Schneider, "Jordan Anti-Terror Figure Apparent Bomb Target," The Washing-
ton Post I March 2002 , p. A 17. 
11 Sana Kamal, "Troops to Mazar," Middle East lnlernational 21 December 2001, pp . I 7-
18. 
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ing the regime and, combined with continued curbs on public 
demonstrations, the measures motivated some to charge that the 
government was exploiting the crisis in order to return the coun-
try to the days of martial law.12 
Throughout this domestic squeeze, Jordan stood behind US 
policy in confronting al-Qaeda; however, it repeatedly expressed 
opposition to American plans that involved attacks on Iraq or any 
other Arab state. During King Abdullah's September 28 trip to 
Washington, D.C., the Jordanian press reported he had extracted 
a promise from the Bush administration that it would not target 
Iraq or any other Arab country, a pledge that was quickly called 
into question by continued statements from Bush officials sug-
gesting America would strike at any state harboring terrorist 
elements. 13 Subsequent Jordanian warnings against Iraq were 
met with similarly ambiguous US responses. Jordan's concerns 
for the US terror fighting strategy were also raised by the dete-
rioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the repeated Israeli 
incursions into territories handed back to the Palestinian Author-
ity. Ever since the events of September 11, King Abdullah has 
been quick to echo public sentiment by connecting the attacks on 
the US to larger issues in the region, saying during one interview 
that "if the United States had resolved the problems in the Mid-
dle East, notably the Israeli-Palestinian question, I seriously 
doubt that they [September 11 attacks] would have taken 
place. " 14 Jordan's push for the US to forcefully engage Israeli-
Palestinian diplomacy has only grown with the escalation of vio-
12 Sana Kamal, "Tightening the Screws, " Middle East International 26 October 2001, p. 
2 I. 
13 Kamal, "Taking No Chances . " Middle East International 12 October 200 I, p . 11. 
14 
"King: Attacks Add Urgency to Mideast Solution," The Jordan Times 13 October 
2001. 
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lence between the two and America's reticence to heed Jordan's 
counsel has threatened to strain relations . 
But in spite of these differences in specific policy directions, 
Jordan's official pronouncements do not yet indicate signs of a 
breach in the strong strategic bond with the US formed over 
fighting terror. Indeed, members of the Jordanian regime empha-
size that they understood the dangers posed by terror networks 
long before the West and reiterate that the country's resolve to 
fight extremism is unwavering. 15 Still, individuals inside and 
outside elite Jordanian circles regularly express suspicion over 
western motives behind fighting terror and worry whether Jor-
dan's support will eventually result in a widening split between 
the Jordanian state and street. 16 In the eyes of some, Jordan is 
hanging between dependency on Washington and its own public 
opm10n. 
JORDAN'S CHANGfNG POSITION IN THE REGION 
One path to explaining a country's foreign policy stance is to 
assume that states are primarily reacting to forces they confront 
in the regional or international system: thus, the nature of exter-
nal threats or challenges will dictate appropriate responses. 17 For 
a relatively weak state like Jordan operating in a dangerous re-
gional and international environment, at least three possible re-
sponses exist: balancing, bandwagoning, or onmibalancing. 
Balancing and bandwagoning essentially constitute opposite re-
actions to a perceived threat: either a country allies with others to 
offset danger or it aligns with a source of peril in order to mini-
15 
"For Jordan, Ther e Is No Grey Area in Anti -Terrori sm Fight," The Jordan Times I 0 
December 200 I . 
16 Ian Fisher , "On Streets of Jordan , Doubts Lurk About War ," The New York Times 6 
October 200 I, p . 83 . 
17 A key argument along these lines can be found in Stephen Walt , The Origins of Alli-
ances (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1987) . 
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mize its impact or share in the resulting spoils (Walt 1987, 97). 
Omnibalancing is a form of alignment decision that assumes 
choices will be made based on an assessment of all threats facing 
the regime- external and internal - and will reflect a regime 's 
primary desire to survive (David 1991). 
When considering Jordan's traditional position in the Middle 
East, Jordan has typically been characterized as a strategically 
vulnerable moderate Arab state that carefully navigates its way 
through inter-Arab politics while the king and his tight cadre of 
foreign policy makers typically harbor pro-western sympathies. 
Moreover, its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been con-
sidered particularly important given its geographic proximity to 
Israel and its large Palestinian population, much of which came 
to Jordan to escape the ravages of regional conflict. According to 
this perspective , although Jordan maintained tacit understandings 
with Israel for many years in order to enhance its security, his-
torical Jordanian claims to the West Bank and a need for its poli-
cies toward Israel to respond to its Palestinian majority 
necessitated that the country resist converting this relationship 
into a formal peace arrangement for fear of suffering a backlash 
from other Arab states (Ryan 1998). This fear was reinforced 
after Jordan's leaders watched Egypt endure isolation in response 
to concluding its own separate peace with Israel. Beginning in 
the mid-1980s, however, King Hussein undertook to reposition 
Jordan in the region, an effort that culminated in the country's 
renunciation of claims to the West Bank late in the decade . Stra-
tegically, this move ended any possibilities of the King negotiat-
ing on behalf of Palestinians and simplified the prospects for 
concluding an agreement with Israel by diminishing Jordan's 
part in the process to settling matters of sovereignty along the 
east bank of the Jordan River. Following this shift, Jordan was 
integral in creating the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), an 
alignment of Egypt, Iraq, North Yemen, and Jordan to primarily 
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promote inter-Arab economic cooperation. The emergence of 
this organization further clarified Jordan's evolving strategic role 
as a state pushing regional economic integration and a new 
pathway for the future of the Middle East. Though the ACC had 
little in the way of an explicit military component, Jordan's alli-
ance with Iraq and Egypt also allowed it to associate with two 
key powers that provided a degree of balance against its chief 
regional security concerns at the time, Israel and Syria. 18 
This alignment was soon shaken, however, by Iraq's 1990 in-
vasion of Kuwait. Although Jordan shared little ideologically 
with Baghdad's ruling establishment and condemned Iraq's 
breach of Kuwaiti sovereignty, because the country's political 
and economic ties to Iraq had grown significantly since the mid-
1970 's the King and others considered the relationship to be vital 
(Baram 1991 ). Essentially, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait had 
trapped Jordan between the countervailing threats of Israel and 
Iraq, with both powers occupying Arab land. As a result, Jor-
dan's initial response sought to promote an Arab solution to the 
Iraqi crisis that attempted to build links between it and the ongo-
ing Israeli seizure of Palestinian lands while pointing to the con-
tradictions inherent in rapid western mobilization against Iraq 
and years of quiescence in the face of Israeli occupation (Lesch 
1991 ). With this stance, Jordan quickly found itself caught in 
another strategic bind, at odds with fellow ACC member Egypt 
as well as America's anti-Iraq coalition building. Soon it was 
forced to choose between once compatible associations. Strategi-
cally, the stronger case for alignment seemingly rested with join-
ing the anti-Iraq coalition, particularly given Jordan's historically 
pro-western orientation and the offers of enhanced aid extended 
by Saudi Arabia and others. In the end, however, when King 
11 For more on this alignment, see Curtis Ryan ( 1998) "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of 
the Arab Cooperation Council ," Middle East Journal 52 (3): 386-401 . 
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Hussein's efforts at mediating the crisis failed, he bowed to 
Arabist pressures and pursued a course consistent with omnibal-
ancing, choosing not to abandon Iraq and thereby endure politi-
cal ostracism from the US and Jordan's former Gulf Arab allies. 
Although Jordan was siding with the weaker party strategically, 
its moves followed logically from its commitment to finding a 
regional solution. The choice also reflected popular pro-Iraqi 
sentiments being expressed within Jordan, especially among 
elements of the country's security and military ranks that pro-
vided critical support for the monarchy, as well as within Pales-
tinian segments of society that had long been an internal security 
concern (Garnham 1991, 74). 
The political isolation Jordan experienced for its decision was 
great in the short term and soon after the Gulf War ended, the 
country 's leaders strived to regain Jordan's standing within the 
region while attempting to reclaim its prior measure of universal 
international acceptance. The country quickly rehabilitated itself 
strategically with the US and the West by breaking with a weak-
ened Iraq and eventually welcomed Iraqi dissidents to Amman. 
Moreover, after Israel and the Palestinians cleared the way for 
peace politically by completing the Oslo Accord, Jordan con-
cluded its own treaty with Israel in the hopes of reaping eco-
nomic and political rewards. However, as peace with Israel failed 
to realize its early potential and concerns about Jordan's alien-
ation in the Arab world grew, its leaders moved to restore rela-
tions with the Gulf states and gradually even began to play a 
subtle leading role in Arab reconciliation with Iraq . 19 At the same 
time, mounting worries over the security ramifications of grow-
ing Israeli-Palestinian tensions prompted the Jordanian govern-
ment to launch a crackdown on Hamas officials in Jordan . As the 
19 See Sana Kamal, "M~nding Fences." Middle Enst lnternntionn/ 28 July 2000, pp. 14-
15. 
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second Palestinian intifada that began in September 2000 grew 
in intensity, Jordan's regional and international efforts to diffuse 
Israeli-Palestinian tensions escalated in order to prevent Palestin-
ian frustration from destabilizing Jordan's always delicate demo-
graphic balance. 20 
In light of these efforts, Jordan's stance to align with the US 
against terror could be viewed as a logical extension of a form of 
bandwagoning that has marked the country's foreign policy since 
the end of the Gulf War and that is largely consistent with the 
country's tendencies historically. Regionally, Jordan finds itself 
solidifying its ties today with powers like Saudi Arabia that are 
directly challenged by al-Qaeda and internationally it is position-
ing itself to stand behind US political and military muscle. 
Moreover, if the King was in fact a target of al-Qaeda and many 
of the country's tourist destinations were labeled for attack, Jor-
dan's recent alignments could further be regarded as an effort to 
counter a significant threat to the security of both the regime and 
the country. At the same time, Jordan's work to convince its 
American ally to forgo operations against Iraq and instead devote 
its terror-fighting energies to engaging the Palestinian issue more 
directly and diplomatically could be viewed as attempting to 
head off more immediate security concerns. What Jordan fears 
from a move against Iraq is the possibility that Iraq could again 
attack Israel and engulf much of the country's perimeter in con-
flict. Meanwhile, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence always 
contains the potential to create a spillover effect in Jordan, with 
worry of a massive, forced Palestinian population transfer part of 
a worst case scenario. 21 
20 See Sana Kamal, "Hamas : Has Jordan Gone Too Far?" Middle Enst Jnternntionnl 26 
November 1999, pp . 3,6; Sana Kamal, "Intifada Jitters," Middle Ens/ l11ternnlionnl 22 
December 2000, pp. 9-10 . 
21 See for example comments by the current Prime Minister of Jordan in "PM Says Pales-
tinians Should Prove Ability to Establish State," The Jordan Times I July 2002 . 
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It is also clear that associating categorically with the US war 
on terror carries significant strategic risks for Jordan as revealed 
by the omnibalancing concept. For one, the move has exposed 
Jordan openly as an ally of the US at a particularly sensitive 
moment. In the current regional and global climate, a closer rela-
tionship with the US invites more attention from terrorist ele-
ments that seek to illustrate the moral banlauptcy of prevailing 
Arab regimes and simultaneously damage US interests. More 
critically, however, a strong Jordanian connection with the US 
complicates the regime's efforts to maintain a credible Arabist 
posture and assure security domestically. In the past, Arab suspi-
cions of Jordanian motives have escalated when it sides with the 
West and Jordan's leaders have often been sensitive to critiques 
that charged too close an alignment with the West at the expense 
of its place in the Arab world. A recent example of this dynamic 
came in 1997 during Jordan's participation as an observer in 
Turkish-Israeli military maneuvers which drew the ire of many 
in the region. Similar criticisms have been leveled by Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia over Jordan's willingness to contribute forces to the 
US campaign in Afghanistan. 22 Moreover, US policies that target 
Iraq and favor Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians are 
widely unpopular within Jordanian society and in the Arab world 
more broadly and they have provoked strong public reactions 
inside Jordan, reactions the regime has sought in term to limit.23 
When viewed through this prism, Jordan's response to the war 
on terror is courting domestic, regional and possibly now 
international security threats that a decade earlier the country 
explicitly chose to avoid confronting. 
22 Kam Sana Kamal, "Troops to Mazar," Middle East International 21 December 2001, 
pp. 17-18. 
23 See Marc Lynch, "Jordan's King Abdullah in Washington," MERIP Press Information 
Note 94, 8 May 2002, http://www.merip.org /pins/pin94.htm1. 
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DOMESTIC POLITrCS AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 
Though aspects of omnibalancing do attempt to incorporate 
domestic interests, for the most part the previous account relies 
on the behavior of other actors in the system to explain the for-
eign policy orientation of a state . However, a second set of ex-
planatory variables revolves specifically around domestic 
factors . In general , this perspective seeks to incorporate the on-
going processes of identity construction in a state, the dynamics 
of intra-state coalitions and civil society, and the pressures of 
economic interdependence and state driven economic develop-
ment into calculations of the security dilemmas faced by a state 
(Lawson 1993). As changes in these areas occur domestically , 
they alter a regime 's calculation of threats and the salience of the 
security dilemma a state confronts (Lawson 1993, 123). 
Since I 989, Jordan's monarchical system has been changing. 
Beginning in 1986, King Hussein reconvened Parliament that 
had been dismissed almost two decades earlier and in 1989, he 
sanctioned new elections after painful economic reforms sparked 
riots and social unrest in cities traditionally loyal to the monar-
chy. The results of these elections saw Islamists win almost as 
many of the 80 seats contested as regime loyalists and created 
the prospects for more contentious politics within the country. 
However, Jordan's strategic break with the anti-Iraq coalition 
clearly had the impact of unifying contending domestic constitu-
encies. Jordanians from across the political spectrum sympa-
thized with the Iraqi position against what was regarded as an 
arrogant Kuwaiti regime that had exploited inexpensive Jorda-
nian labor for years. Despite the added economic hardships 
borne by Jordan 's choice to favor Iraq in the conflict , King Hus-
sein 's decision ultimately opened the door for Islamic participa-
tion in the government and solidified the regime 's standing at 
home. 
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As time progressed in Jordan, however, the path of political 
and economic liberalization embarked upon by the regime be-
came more controversial domestically. Changes in Jordan's elec-
toral law that replaced a multiple vote system with a "one 
person-one vote" scheme severely and purposefully cut into Is-
lamic representation after the 1993 elections and eventually re-
sulted in many Islamist parties boycotting parliamentary 
elections in 1997. Jordan's peace treaty with Israel in 1994 came 
as a shock to many in the country and quickly gave rise to a 
popular movement against normalization of relations with Israel. 
The strength of this movement together with other changes un-
derway in Jordanian civil society prompted the state to place sig-
nificant controls on organized groups, including strict limits on 
the capacity of sanctioned organizations to engage in explicit 
political behavior (Wiktorowicz 1998). All this has constrained 
domestic political debate and contributed to a significant drop in 
the Jordanian public's faith in democratic politics while provok-
ing scholars to coin phrases like "fa9ade democracy" to describe 
what the country is practicing. 24 In economic terms too, Jordan 
continued to struggle throughout the 1990s with low growth 
rates, high unemployment, and strict limits on economic help 
from the government in order to remain compliant with Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment requirements. 
Periodic social unrest arose in key areas of traditional regime 
support, particularly in reaction to state cutbacks on subsidies or 
other measures connected to complying with international eco-
nomic agreements. Corruption remained a problem in the econ-
omy as well and government credibility on economic matters 
24 
"Jordanian Democratization Process Bad, But Better Than Elsewhere-C SS Poll," 171e 
Jordan Times 26 Septen,ber 2001; Quintan Wiktorowicz (1999) "The Limits of Democ-
racy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan," The Middle East Journal 53 (4): 606-620 . 
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Palestinians who have been left to find their way in the now fa-
vored private sector. 
At another level too, some scholars of Jordanian politics have 
noted an identity change underway within the Kingdom, leading 
to a new level of contestation within Jordan's "public sphere. "26 
After long responding to pressures inherent in the country's pre-
vailing Arabist identity, more recently a "nationalizing project" 
pushed by the country's leadership has encouraged Jordan to be-
come more state-centric and transformed its policy preferences. 
Whereas Jordan once had been motivated to frame its foreign 
policy so that it would maintain an accepted place within an 
Arab consensus, gradually the regime now calculates interests at 
an inherently state level while regionally emphasizing the as-
pects of its foreign policy that can modernize and transform the 
position of the Arab region in a globalizing world. Although 
many domestic constituencies quietly supp011 the changes un-
derway, the new outlook still has influential opponents, espe-
cially among Arab nationalist, Palestinian and selected Islamic 
quarters. The extent to which the state limits or represses public 
expressions of this opposition indicates a failure on its part to 
persuade these and other constituencies and potentially signals 
the continued presence of doubts over Jordan's course within 
portions of the state itself. 
Given these prevailing domestic conditions, one can see some 
limited potential advantages to a Jordan aligned strongly against 
terror and with the US At the international level, Jordan is again 
being held up as a model of moderation by the US and such ex-
ternal political support can help the regime promote the advan-
tages inherent in its commitment to change with its domestic 
26 One important proponent of this argument is Marc Lynch. See Marc Lynch, "Jordan's 
Identity and Interests ," in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds. Identity and For-
eign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp . 26-57 . 
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was badly damaged recently by exaggerated claims of growth 
and prosperity that were exposed by external observers. 
What has emerged throughout this time is a gradual diver-
gence of state interests with public opinion in the country. While 
the regime seeks to contain domestic frustration with economic 
hardships and maintain control over political processes through 
the manipulation of electoral laws and timing of elections, Jor-
danians themselves continue to seek greater and more meaning-
ful avenues of political expression and influence. Periodic 
demonstrations, either protesting unpopular governmental poli-
cies or supporting causes the government is not endorsing, have 
become more prevalent and have motivated the regime to place 
more significant restrictions on public gatherings. Despite such 
limits, demonstrations are nonetheless occasionally organized 
and sometimes provoke harsh governmental reactions. Other 
recent examples of unsanctioned political behavior include 
grassroots publication of a "blacklist" of Jordanian enterprises 
that do business with Israel and an attempt to organize a popular 
boycott of US products sold in Jordan in light of US attacks on 
Afghanistan. The severity of this breach between the public and 
the state has grown more acute since King Abdullah assumed the 
throne in 1999. Although the new monarch initially ingratiated 
himself publicly with surprise royal visits calling attention to 
underperforming state enterprises in the name of reform, increas-
ingly attention has shifted to his difficulty in conciliating diver-
gent factions in the country and promoting a successful socio-
economic plan furthering development. 25 Of particular note here 
too are rising tensions between East Bank Jordanians who have 
traditionally controlled the public sector of the economy and 
25 Douglas Jehl, "The King and the 'Cabby' Inspect Jordan Incognito," The New York 
Times 9 August 1999, p. A I, A9; Neil MacFarquhar , "Hopes for Change in Jordan Are 
Beginning to Fade," The New York Times 9 April 2001, p. 3. 
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allies .27 In a practical sense too, since the events of September 11 
have been devastating to many vital developing industries in the 
country like tourism, siding with the US held out the prospects 
for domestic economic relief. Jordan 's strategic choice was 
clearly influential in speeding a finalized and quickly imple-
mented free trade agreement with the US, which Jordan has 
trumpeted as an accomplishment that will help enhance the qual-
ity of life for many Jordanians. However, these benefits remain 
tied to the external arena and in any event do not appear to out-
weigh the advantages Jordan would accrue domestically had it 
adopted a more ambiguous position or kept more diplomatic dis-
tance between itself and America. It has become increasingly 
clear in recent times that processes of political liberalization in 
Jordan have been intentionally slowed- to some, the primary 
aim of the country 's "democratization" was always to further 
entrench traditional pillars of power in their positions while 
nominally bowing to the forces of political challenge (Robinson 
1998). Although frustration with the slow pace of political re-
forms is not widely evident due to stifled channels of political 
expression , Jordan 's choice to ally closely with the US adds sali-
ent areas of difference between the regime and much of the pub-
lic over approaches to the condition of the Palestinians and the 
future of Iraq that today find little political space for airing. 
Moreover, whenever some Israeli-Palestinian political accom-
modation is reached, Jordan faces a potentially wrenching do-
mestic process of compelling Palestinians to choose between 
being Palestinian (and perhaps having political rights in Jordan 
permanently curbed) or being Jordanian (and thereby relinquish-
ing claims to political activity in a future Palestinian state). 
Should such a moment arise, the level of legitimacy enjoyed by 
27 Eric Schmitt, "Official Seeks Aid for States Where Islam is Moderate, " The New York 
Times 2 June 2002 , p. 4. 
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the Jordanian regime will be critical. Combining this impending 
challenge with the persistent hardships many Jordanians con-
tinue to experience from a slow-growing economy further ex-
poses political gaps between state and society. Although few 
regard the Jordanian monarchy as under any direct or fundamen-
tal challenge today, its long term future is never assured given 
the future it faces. By siding with the US, the regime has taken 
additional steps to underscore several areas of contention that 
have divided the government from its people over the last several 
years . 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND BUDGET SECURJTY 
Whereas a political economy and budgetary security frame-
work shares ground with the previous perspective in that it con-
siders domestic threats as relevant to explaining a nation's 
alignment decisions, it diverges by assuming specifically that a 
regime's estimates of its own economic needs and weaknesses 
can shape foreign policy decisions, especially regarding alliances 
(Brand 1994). The key priority emphasized here is the need for 
the regime to promote and protect state solvency and sources of 
state revenue (including trade, aid, remittances, and customs du-
ties) in order to ·ensure the health of the domestic economy. The 
presumption is that a state will align with one or more actors 
primarily to prevent economic crises or otherwise enhance its 
economic stability (Brand 2001). 
There is little doubt that in the past twenty years, Jordan's po-
litical economy has been a central challenge for the regime. 
While long a poor country with few natural resources in a 
wealthy region, by the 1970s Jordan had become dependent for 
much of its annual revenue on external aid from its Arab 
neighbors and remittances from large segments of its labor force 
employed elsewhere. Moreover, the state was primarily support-
ing the domestic economy by serving as primary employer, fun-
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der for development and social welfare projects , and subsidizer 
of many basic life staples (Brynen 1992). Between 1981 and 
1987, a slumping oil market drove Jordan 's revenue base down 
dramatically and plunged the country into economic crisis. Typi-
cal of develop ing countries under such stress , the state borrowed 
heavily to finance its growing budget deficit rather than cut ex-
penditures and risk domestic discontent. Soon, Jordan had ex-
hausted its own reserves and could no longer finance its $8.4 
billion debt (Reed 1990). When the government sought IMF help 
to reschedule its debt in the spring 1989, the terms exacted for 
such aid included cuts in consumer subsidies, price increases and 
other painful economic reforms , all of which quickly led to do-
mestic unrest in key areas of traditional support for the monarchy 
and compelled King Hussein to begin opening up the political 
system (Rath 2001 ). Gradually too, the era of Jordan relying 
primarily on external sources of income support was ending 
(Brand 2001) The country 's transition from a rentier economy to 
an economy based on domestic production for export required 
new external alliances and by the 1980s, these needs were al-
ready beginning to influence Jordan's alignment choices, includ-
ing revised relationships with Syria, Iraq and Egypt (Brand 2001, 
145-150) . 
The outbreak of regional crises with Iraq 's invasion of Ku-
wait placed a series of undesirable economic choices before Jor-
danian foreign policy makers and again from this perspective 
seemed to auger for allying the country with the coalition con-
fronting Iraq. After all, Jordan had long been dependent upon 
Gulf aid and economic markets, with Saudi Arabia in particular 
standing as its second largest trading partner and most reliable 
source of assistance and subsidized oil. The Saudis made clear to 
Jordan that they would reward or punish depending on the choice 
it made (Brand 1991 ). On the other hand , Iraq was Jordan's larg-
est trading partner, a source of inexpensive oil, and an important 
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client in the Jordanian port of Aqaba, where many Iraqi imports 
and exports were transshipped away over the past eight years 
from the dangers in the Persian Gulf War with Iran. Walking 
away from Iraq meant leaving behind a key source of energy and 
potentially losing access to Iraqi markets even beyond the terms 
of any sanctions regime directed against Baghdad. Though an 
economic explanation alone does not fully account for why Jor-
dan chose to side with Iraq and incur huge short-term costs, it 
does emphasize the limited maneuverability Jordan possessed 
economically at the time of the crisis (Brand 1999). More sig-
nificantly, while Jordan's decision to side with Iraq in the wake 
of the crisis cost it Gulf and American aid as revenue sources, it 
became a major beneficiary of cheap Iraqi oil and allowed the 
King to mollify key constituencies that national revenues contin-
ued to support, including the country's military and security 
forces. At the same time, the move ultimately interrupted eco-
nomic restructuring and thereby delayed the additional pain and 
dislocation associated with long-term changes. 
Since the second Gulf War, Jordan has walked a tighter line 
on economic reform than on political liberalization. After regain-
ing American aid in the wake of its break with Iraq, the govern-
ment implemented a second phase of economic adjustment 
policies in conjunction with the IMF, which included eliminating 
bread subsidies and again provoked rioting in southern Jordanian 
towns like Kerak and Maan. Unlike what prevailed in the previ-
ous round of economic reforms, however, Jordan's macroeco-
nomic conditions were showing temporary signs of improvement 
and the government had learned how to manage the political lib-
eralization process more to its liking. The result was it did not 
respond to additional social unrest with more political openness 
but rather with a crackdown on demonstrations and threats of an 
"iron-fist" to restore order (Ryan 1998). Jordan's move to strike 
a peace deal with Israel was motivated partly by economic con-
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siderations as well. Peace with Israel not only held the prospects 
for opening Israeli markets (as opposed to Iraqi markets) and 
expanding domestic industries like tourism but it meant the pos-
sibility of courting more sustained US and western assistance, 
including most critically debt rescheduling and relief. However, 
clearly Jordan has not been able to reap all the economic advan-
tages it sought from its accord with Israel and this has in turn 
more recently fueled the country's tentative initiatives that pro-
mote Arab reconciliation with Iraq, a stance popular with por-
tions of Jordan's increasingly important private economic sector. 
Push for economic change has been further accelerated by 
King Abdullah's accession to the throne and his priority to pro-
mote national economic development by making Jordan a re-
gional trade center and modernizing the country for entry into 
the globalizing world economy. Not only has Jordan attained 
membership in the World Trade Organization and been active in 
regional economic conferences but it also began establishing 
Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), where products are jointly 
manufactured by Israeli and Jordanian firms and enter US mar-
kets duty-free , and created the Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
(ASEZ) to enhance the production and flow of Jordanian exports 
and attract foreign capital into the country. Efforts to privatize 
state firms expanded markedly and the government sought to 
generate more revenues domestically by raising sales taxes and 
continuing to cut government subsidies (Andoni 2000) . In addi-
tion, the King sought to entice information technology industries 
like Microsoft to develop Jordan's future infrastructure (Cun-
ningham 2002). 
Despite the continued emphasis on economic transformation 
underway, questions remain about who benefits from this activ-
ity. Many of the costs associated with the early phases of privati-
zation and economic restructuring were clearly felt most readily 
by the middle and lower classes in Jordan. It is estimated today 
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that upwards of one-third of the population still lives below the 
poverty line.28 Moreover, the pace of economic transformation 
has been a touchstone of resistance among many entrenched 
groups in the country which have spawned grassroots opposition 
to normalization with Israel and questioned the wisdom of im-
mersing a tribal society in the global market. Though critics of 
Abdullah's direction themselves remain badly divided, the clash 
between "modernizers" and "traditionalists" has nonetheless 
been a noticeable factor in the survival and demise of successive 
governments recently within Jordan. When outgoing Prime Min-
ister Abdul Raouf Rawabda was relieved of his post in favor of 
Ali Abu Ragheb in 2000, the key charge given the new govern-
ment was to implement another round of socio-economic reform 
that the previous government had failed to enact. 
Given the economic priorities now being pursued by Abdul-
lah and the tangible needs that accompany it, the King seemingly 
concluded that continued support of the West and especially the 
US was essential. Although Jordan's primary creditors today are 
Japan and European nations, enthusiastic US backing provides 
the regime with leverage in attempting to win the debt relief and 
competition for new foreign direct investment that the country 
seeks. Jordan quickly profited by its support of America's war on 
terror when the Bush administration prodded final congressional 
approval and expedited implementation of the Jordan-US free 
trade agreement, with Bush underscoring that countries support-
ing peace and economic reform stood to gain "concrete bene-
fits. "29 A doubling of US foreign aid to $450 million has also 
been proposed. While Jordan has made strides to increase oppor-
28 
"Current Poverty Strategies Might Take Years to Bear Fruit," The Jordan Times 14 
December 200 I . 
29 Richard Stevenson, "Senate Approves Bill to Lift Barriers to Trade With Jordan," The 
New York_Timel? 25 September 200 I, pp. Cl, C6. 
VOL. 30 2002 
112 CREED 
tunities for basic education and access to health care, pressures 
to· provide jobs with higher living standards to a society where 
half of its five million people are under age 20 remains a central 
economic challenge. Economists estimate that Jordan's economy 
must create more than 50,000 new jobs annually to absorb work-
ers entering the market and begin lowering the country's stub-
bornly high unemployment rate and it must grow at six percent 
or more annually in order to lift per capita_ incomes above 
$1,700.3° Corruption and the practice of was ta (connections) also 
remain critical obstacles the country must overcome. Although 
recent surveys indicate that more substantial portions of the Jor-
danian population support aspects of economic restructuring, 
their endorsements are clearly driven by a conception of change 
that promotes new job creation, better goods and lower prices.31 
In a country with scarce resources and chronic water shortages 
but desiring to promote domestic production over external 
sources of revenue, sustained and dependable sources of outside 
help and access to markets remain critical if Jordan's economic 
goals are to be realized. Add to this equation a fear of regional 
violence and terrorism that brings with it an accompanying drop 
in tourism, foreign investment and exports and the motivations 
behind Jordan's choice to side openly with the West become 
clearer still. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Though it would be an overstatement to conclude that eco-
nomic and budgetary factors were the sole elements driving Jor-
danian foreign policy and specifically its recent decision to ally 
30 
"Current Poverty Strategies Might Take Years to Bear Fruit"; "World Bank Approves 
$120 Million Loan to Jordan," The Jordan Times 4 July 2002 . 
31 Fahed Fanek, "Privitization Gains Popular Support," The Jordan Times 8 October 
2001. 
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so strongly with the US against terror, increasingly it appears 
that any explanation is markedly incomplete without these con-
siderations. Not only has economic development become a key 
priority of King Abdullah's agenda but Jordan is also unques-
tionably engaged in an attempt to move its economic base to-
ward more domestic production and into the global market 
instead of relying so heavily on external rents and state-
controlled enterprises. This shift is both economically ambitious 
and politically sensitive: for years, Palestinians have dominated 
the weak private sector while East Bank Jordanians have con-
trolled state-owned entities. Changes in economic emphasis in-
evitably now mean struggles to retain political power and the 
potential for changes in who wields power. Early signs of this 
came as King Abdullah sought to strengthen his own hold on the 
throne . His creation of a new Economic Consultative Council 
(ECC) to provide advice on economic policy includes many of 
the country's young economic elite and is accountable only to 
the King. Increasingly, the ECC's power is seen as exceeding 
that of the formal government (there is now overlap between the 
ECC and the Abu Ragheb cabinet) and while its mandate is fo-
cused on the economy, its range of influence now extends deep 
into all realms of the country's affairs. The "economization" of a 
new elite hand picked by the King and serving at his discretion 
may be underway (Schlumberger and Bank 2001-2002). 32 For 
Jordan to manage such complex and delicate processes with any 
prospects of success, its leadership has seemingly concluded that 
support from the West and particularly the US is critical and can 
be assured only if Jordan's policies are geared to court it. In a 
n As a further example of this point, Jordan's newly appointed ambassador to the US, 
Karim Kawar , is an IT entrepreneur and friend of Abdullah whose only prior political 
experience was sitting on the ECC. His appointment makes the first time the post has 
been assigned to someone with primarily business as opposed to political experience . 
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climate punctuated by terror, Jordan 's aims are imperiled and the 
country itself need not be a target for many of the damaging ef-
fects to be felt. Political violence directed at the US that carries 
with it a critique of Arab regimes it supports as illegitimate, cor-
rupt , and directly responsible for the many impoverished in the 
region poses a threat to Jordan at many different levels. 
But because policy is not made on the basis of a single set of 
factors, when one looks further into Jordan's situation , real di-
lemmas emerge. Close relations with a US government that is 
staunchly supportive of Israel's fight against the Palestinians and 
determined to bring about regime change in Iraq inevitably asso-
ciates Jordan with these initiatives, especially in the minds of a 
public that largely disapproves of American means if not its 
goals altogether. Even granting that an identity shift may be un-
derway within both leadership and public that motivates inore 
Jordanians to evaluate the Palestinian and Iraqi issues from state-
centric as opposed to Arabist perspectives, the monarchy must 
still weigh the domestic reactions to America's hegemonic med-
dling in these cases with care . Jordan 's leaders ultimately have 
little capacity to influence the American foreign policymaking 
process and assuredly , hostility to American moves in the region 
will be directed eventually at the Jordanian government that has 
failed to stand with the population. In the past, this dynamic has 
led the regime to suppress domestic expression and further jeop-
ardize political liberalization; indeed , Jordan 's processes of po-
litical liberalization have long been tied to foreign policy 
developments in these issue areas (Brand 1999). Recent deci-
sions by King Abdullah to postpone parliamentary elections and 
endorse a revised electoral law that does little to address domes-
tic concerns are disquieting developments in themselves, but 
they also signal continuity with past trends . Only if the region is 
relatively quiet (and the regime can satisfy itself that an Islamist 
opposition will not prevail) may legislative elections be held in 
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2002. Moreover, according to the regime's explanations for the 
continuity in the electoral arrangements, only when the Palestin-
ian issue is resolved might Jordan's system of political represen-
tation begin to reflect popular will. 33 Add to these recent setbacks 
the continued tough press restrictions and high profile trials of 
critics like Toujan Faisal who speak out against the government 
and the climate for political openness in Jordan is further 
chilled .34 While al-Qaeda's ideology does not suggest a democ-
ratic alternative, the continuing repressive, dynastic and patri-
monial tendencies of a Jordanian regime pursuing unpopular 
foreign policies gives voice to some of its claims. More directly, 
Jordan's search for economic stability and budget security is fur-
ther undermining efforts at democratization that both Jordanian 
and American leaders rhetorically support and that much of the 
population clearly desires. 
In the end, Jordan is unlike many other Arab states in that it 
does not face a direct Islamic "threat"-relations between the 
monarchy and its Islamist critics, while often tense, have never 
yet tended toward political extremism. 35 Nor does the Jordanian 
regime today face any imminent danger from Palestinian nation-
alists, as it once feared in the early days of the PLO. Indeed, pre-
vailing assessments of Abdullah 's position indicate he has 
stabilized himself as monarch and is not directly threatened 
unless domestic or regional conditions change dramatically. 36 
But Jordan is like many of its regional neighbors in that it con-
33 Sana Kamal, "Democratic Tests," Middle East International 30 July 1999, pp . 14-15. 
" Sana Kamal, "Shameful Verdict ," Middle East International 31 May 2002, p. 14. See 
also Jillian Schwedler, "Don't Blink : Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing," 
MERIP Press Information Note 98, 3 July 2002 http ://www.merip .org/pins/pin98 .html. 
35 For more on this dynamic, see Hanna Freij and Leonard Robinson, "Liberalization, the 
Isla mists and the Stability of the Arab State : Jordan as a Case Study," The M11s/im World 
86 (I) : 1-32; Quin tan Wiktorowicz, "lslamists, the State and Cooperation in Jordan," 
Arab Studies Q11arterly 21 (4) : 1-17. 
36 Economist Intelligence Unit, Co11ntry Report Jordan , March 2002, p. 7. 
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fronts a longer-term future in which large numbers of its young 
citizens will seek political opportunities and higher standards of 
living while continuing to shape an identity for themselves and 
their communities that is bounded by historical and cultural tra-
ditions. As they pursue these aims, they will inevitably want and 
expect the country's leaders to facilitate these activities eco-
nomically and not hinder them politically.37 Recent upsurges in 
regional tensions that have helped significantly alter the course 
and pace of democratic change in Jordan and elsewhere in the 
region have sounded alarms about the future ramifications of 
such developments. 38 Moreover, the goals of people in Jordan 
and elsewhere in the Arab world will be shaped in an external 
environment led for the foreseeable future by US power that 
some regard as stronger and more widely influential than any 
hegemony the world has ever known (Wohlford 1994). Jordan is 
risking a great deal politically and hoping for a great deal 
economically in exchange for accommodating American 
priorities in the region. But because it is powerless to influence 
the directions of US policy, its choices may yet force the country 
to accede to ever-greater American demands for support against 
Iraq or compliance in the face of American-endorsed Israeli 
moves against the Palestinians. 39 Thus far, Jordan's leadership 
typically responds publicly only to what it can support of 
America's initiatives in these arenas and tries to ignore all that 
creates policy dilemmas. Before long, however, Jordan may be 
37 For an interesting account of such issues in a Saudi context, see Mai Yamani, Changed 
Identities : The Challenge of a New Generation in Saudi Arabia (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2000). 
38 Many such claims have recently arisen around release of the United Nations Arab 
Human Development Report 2002. See, for example, "UN Report Claims Freedom Will 
Save Arab Deprivation," The Daily Star 2 July 2002; "Self-Doomed to Failure," The 
Economist 6 July 2002, pp .24-26. 
39 For example, rumors have started to spread throughout the country that Jordan may 
become a staging area for US troops invading Iraq. See "Jordan Rejects Report Its Terri-
tory May Be A Launch Pad for Iraq Attack," The Jordan Times 8 July 2002. 
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dilemmas. Before long, however, Jordan may be forced to 
choose sides again and it is not a certainty it would (or could) 
side with its population when the moment arises this time. Ter-
rorism and the responses of nations to it are themselves part of 
this larger dynamic, though they may not always be seen in this 
light. Jordan's reactions to the perils posed by al-Qaeda have less 
to do with immediate security concerns than with long-term stra-
tegic ad economic calculations. How small, relatively vulnerable 
Arab countries like Jordan now respond to the dilemmas posed 
by these dynamics will certainly affect the long-term prospects 
of the country, the region, and perhaps America's place in the 
world as well. 
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